Antipov Oleg Aleksandrovich

A 'terrorist' posted the haul order on the open ati.su exchange under his own company

The court itself recites that the haul request was posted on the public freight exchange ati.su under a real company registered to Antipov. A member of a terrorist group acting conspiratorially does not leave such a digital and paper trail. The court left this circumstance, which directly disproves intent, entirely unassessed in its reasoning — violating the full-inquiry requirement (Art. 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code).

Terror-plot accomplices haggled over a 4,000–5,000 ruble markup

The verdict records ordinary commercial haggling among logisticians over a 4,000–5,000 ruble middleman's markup. Such behavior is incompatible with persons performing 'criminal roles' in a terror plot carrying life sentences: nobody bargains over 4,000 rubles while knowingly hauling an IED. The court cited this fact but never explained why it does not refute Antipov's awareness, substituting assertion for proof of intent (Arts. 17, 307 CPC).

Antipov pressed for cargo documents — the court cited it as evidence without assessing it

The correspondence shows behavior opposite to intent: Antipov is concerned about the absence of shipping documents and presses to have them issued. A person knowingly transporting a concealed IED would not seek to legalize the haul with paperwork. The court folded this correspondence into the prosecution's evidentiary base without any reasoned rejection of its exculpatory value — an unmotivated dismissal of the defense argument (Art. 307 CPC).

For a 'conspiratorial' haul a full set of genuine vehicle and driver documents was collected

The court establishes that the haul was formalized by the rules of lawful logistics — with a lease agreement, genuine driver's license, vehicle registration and the driver's passport. The conspiracy imputed to Antipov excludes collecting and exchanging a full set of genuine documents identifying every participant. Having established these facts, the court was obliged to assess them together with its finding of intent (Arts. 17(2), 307 CPC), yet confined itself to a bare assertion of a 'criminal role'.

Witness: remote brokering without cargo checks is the industry norm. Court: 'subjective perception of character'

Kurochkin's testimony is not a character reference but evidence of industry practice that refutes the verdict's key finding of Antipov's 'substantial breach of the law' (p. 80). Yet the court dismissed all defense witnesses with one blanket formula about their 'subjective perception of the defendants' character' and their not being eyewitnesses — substituting a formal label for reasoning. This violates the reasoned-verdict requirement (Art. 307 CPC) and creates an internal contradiction between pages 80 and 209–210 of the judgment.

Dispatcher witness: not checking cargo or documents is normal shipping practice — that is the driver's job

Witness Levkovich, a transport dispatcher since 2016, stated the industry standard outright: a dispatcher is not responsible for the cargo, does not supervise loading and does not check documents — the driver does. Yet the prosecution charged Bylin and Antipov precisely with the absence of personal cargo control as a mark of a criminal role.